Data from: Human cooperation based on punishment reputation
dos Santos, Miguel; Rankin, Daniel J.; Wedekind, Claus (2013), Data from: Human cooperation based on punishment reputation, Dryad, Dataset, https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.bc260
The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in non-human animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.