Model from: Government regulation of youth sports clubs: An evolutionary game analysis
Data files
Apr 06, 2026 version files 25.56 MB
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Figure_1.tif
2.57 MB
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Figure_10.tif
2.56 MB
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Figure_2.tif
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Figure_3.tif
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Figure_4.tif
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Figure_5-10.m
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Figure_5.tif
2.56 MB
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Figure_6.tif
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Figure_7.tif
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Figure_8.tif
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Figure_9.tif
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Formula_1-14.m
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README.md
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Abstract
Researchers widely use evolutionary game theory in management; it offers new ideas for addressing problems such as ineffective supervision in youth sports clubs and chaotic markets. The sports authorities, youth sports clubs, and consumers constitute the primary entities in an evolutionary game model. Analysts examine each entity's evolutionary path and its final evolutionary stable strategy, and conduct a stability analysis. Finally, simulations of six scenarios of the current functioning of the Chinese sports sector, in combination with government agencies that punish cases of illegal operations, allow for an exploration of the impact of different government supervision models, reward and punishment mechanisms, and industry standards on the effectiveness of supervision. The findings highlight that the sports authorities play a leading role in supervision, the operation of youth sports clubs in a regulated manner hinges on the expected benefits, consumer participation marginally promotes supervision, and excessive and overly strict supervision proves counterproductive, as do excessive rewards. The study recommends the establishment of a high-level government supervision and management system, a scientific and rigorous industry-standard system, an efficient and pragmatic reward and punishment incentive system, and an actively involved social supervision system, implementing measures such as granting law enforcement powers to the sports authorities, accurately formulating industry standards, and refining the reward and punishment mechanism.
Dataset DOI: 10.5061/dryad.6t1g1jxd4
Description of the data and file structure
This upload comprises 12 files, including:
10 TIF format files, corresponding to Figures 1–10 in the paper.
2 MATLAB files, containing the raw data for Equations 5, 6, 11, 12, 17 and 18, and Figures 5 to 10 in the paper.
Files and variables
File: Figure_1.tif
Description: Figure 1. Relationship between the regulatory bodies of youth sports clubs. Figure 1 presents a structural diagram of the relationships among sports authorities, youth sports clubs, and consumers, illustrating the interplay of interests among these parties.
File: Figure_2.tif
Description: Figure 2 Phase diagram of strategy evolution in the sports authorities. Figure 2 demonstrates how the sports authorities strategically evolve based on the probability of strong or weak regulation and the impact of regulation intensity.
File: Figure_3.tif
Description: Figure 3 Phase diagram of strategy evolution of youth sports clubs. Figure 3 demonstrates how youth sports clubs strategically evolve, depending on their regulated or unregulated status and the intensity of regulation.
File: Figure_4.tif
Description: Figure 4. Phase diagram of the strategy evolution of consumers. Figure 4 demonstrates how consumers strategically evolve based on the probabilities of reporting or non-reporting and the impact of regulation intensity.
File: Figure_5.tif
Description: **Figure 5 Triadic subject strategy evolution in scenario 1. **Figure 5 shows the evolutionary trajectory of the three parties' strategies under scenario 1 (in which sports authorities have independent law enforcement powers, establish a scientific and reasonable reward-and-punishment system and industry standards, and accept unfettered reporting channels).
File: Figure_6.tif
Description: Figure 6. Triadic subject strategy evolution in scenario 2. Figure 6 shows the evolutionary trajectory of the three parties' strategies under scenario 2 (unclear who's in charge and many managers). The graph illustrates changes in the strength of sports authorities' regulations, the standardisation of youth sports club operations, and consumers' willingness to report.
File: Figure_7.tif
Description: Figure 7. Triadic subject strategy evolution in scenario 3. Figure 7 shows the evolutionary trajectories of the three parties' strategies under scenario 3 (the industry's rules are too strict). The graph illustrates the slow convergence between clubs and consumers.
File: Figure_8.tif
Description: Figure 8. Triadic subject strategy evolution in scenario 4. Figure 8 shows the evolutionary trajectory of the three parties' strategies under scenario 4 (in which the Sports Department and the Culture and Tourism Department join forces). The graph shows that the system will allocate more funding to youth sports clubs that follow the rules.
File: Figure_9.tif
Description: Figure 9. Triadic subject strategy evolution in scenario 5. Figure 9 shows the evolutionary trajectory of the three parties' strategies under scenario 5 (The sports authorities are separate (with no enforcement powers)). The graph illustrates that the consumer reporting strategy converges to non-reporting, demonstrating that consumer reporting is not a decisive condition for institutional compliance under strong state oversight.
File: Figure_10.tif
Description: Figure 10. Triadic subject strategy evolution in scenario 6. Figure 10 shows the evolutionary trajectory of the three parties' strategies under scenario 6 (The Sports and Education Departments are combined). The graph illustrates a rapid regulatory response, yet persistent non-compliance.
Two new source files have been added.
File: Formula_1-14.m
Description: It calculates the payoffs for the three players’ different strategies. Formulas 1–14 in this paper are derived from the results of calculations in the MATLAB file (Formula 1–14.m).
This file must be opened and edited using MATLAB software.(Software version: MATLAB R2024b.)
File: Figure_5-10.m
Description: It shows a simulation of the evolution of the three players’ strategies for Scenarios 1 to 6. Figures 5–10 are based on the outputs of this MATLAB model files（Figure 5–10.m）. We have now uploaded the corresponding output data files (in .tif formats) for each figure to Dryad, named as: Figure_5.tif , Figure_6.tif , Figure_7.tif , Figure_8.tif, Figure_9.tif , Figure_10.tif .
This file must be opened and edited using MATLAB software. (Software version: MATLAB R2024b.)
This study presents a tripartite evolutionary game model among sports authorities, youth sports clubs and consumer groups. It analyses the behavioural strategies and influencing mechanisms of each subject, explores the influence of the interests of each subject, different regulatory models, rewards and punishment mechanisms on the regulation of youth sports clubs, applies replicated dynamic equations, analyses the equilibrium state of the model to conclude, and combines the empirical analysis with practice to put forward recommendations.